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reducing the availability of surface and groundwater 
sources, and giving rise to water shortages both for 
consumption uses and for environmental flows. Water 
scarcity in irrigated farming systems results in poten-
tially greater economic losses than in rainfed systems, 
due to the higher investments being made on the farm. 
To manage water scarcity, deficit irrigation has been 
studied and implemented, particularly to ligneous 
crops, showing satisfactory results (Ruiz-Sanchez et 
al., 2010). Water markets are commonly used in Aus-
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Abstract
Hydrological droughts are a major risk for irrigated agriculture in many regions of the world. The aim of this article is to propose 
an insurance tool to help irrigators manage the risk of water scarcity in the framework of the Spanish Crop Insurance System (SCIS). 
Only the United States Insurance System provides this type of coverage, but has very restrictive conditions. To determine the type 
of insurance scheme that better fits with the SCIS and to the Spanish irrigated agriculture, an expert panel was held with the par-
ticipation of all stakeholders involved in crop insurance. Following the expert panel conclusions, an hydrological drought index 
insurance (HDII) addressed to irrigation districts (ID) is proposed. It would compensate water deficits suffered in the whole ID. We 
detail the conditions that the ID should fulfill to be eligible for HDII. HDII is applied to the Bardenas Irrigation District V (ID-V) 
in Spain, and the hedging effectiveness of the instrument is analyzed comparing ID-V’s gross margins with and without the insur-
ance contract. Results suggest that the proposed insurance scheme could provide an effective means of reducing farmers’ vulnerabil-
ity to water shortages and there is no major impediment for it to be included as a new line in the SCIS. This type of insurance can 
be generalized to any ID fulfilling the conditions mentioned in this paper.
Additional key words: water supply risk; Spanish Crop Insurance System; Drought Index; water allotment; Bardenas Irrigation 
District.
Abbreviations used: Aux I (Auxiliary Index); C (Irrigation District’s conditions); DI (Drought Index); DMP (Drought Management 
Plan); DSI (Drought Status Indicator); EU (European Union); FD (Insurance scheme with franchise deductible); GM (Gross Margin); 
HDII (Hydrological Drought Index Insurance); ID (Irrigation District); ID-V (Bardenas Irrigation District V); MRSL (Mean Root 
Square Loss); NDVI (Normalized Difference Vegetation Index); NFD (Insurance scheme without franchise deductible); NVAP (Net 
Value of Agricultural Production); SCIS (Spanish Crop Insurance System); γ (franchise deductible).
Authors’ contributions: Conception and design: TM, MB and AG. Expert panel definition and organization: MB and AG. Data 
acquisition: TM and MB. Quantitative analysis and interpretation of results, and drafting of the manuscript: TM. Supervising the 
work and manuscript revision: BM and AG.
Citation: Maestro, T.; Bielza, M.; Garrido, A. (2016). Hydrological drought index insurance for irrigation districts in Spain. 
Spanish Journal of Agricultural Research, Volume 14, Issue 3, e0105. http://dx.doi.org/10.5424/sjar/2016143-8981.
Received: 23 Nov 2015. Accepted: 13 Jul 2016.
Copyright © 2016 INIA. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Non 
Commercial (by-nc) Spain 3.0 Licence, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the 
original work is properly cited.
Funding: National Research, Development and Innovation Plan, Office of the State Secretariat for Research, Development and 
Innovation, Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, Spain (AGL2010-17634).
Competing interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
Correspondence should be addressed to Teresa Maestro: teresa.maestro@upm.es.
Introduction
Drought is one of the main environmental risks in 
Mediterranean Europe. Climate change predictions 
indicate that droughts will intensify in the 21st century 
in the region (IPCC, 2012). One of the main adaptation 
tools to climate change in arid zones is irrigation. 
Drought does not only affect rainfed agriculture; it also 
affects the availability of water for irrigation. Mete-
orological droughts predate hydrological droughts, 
Teresa Maestro, María Bielza, and Alberto Garrido
Spanish Journal of Agricultural Research September 2016 • Volume 14 • Issue 3 • e0105
2
coverage for agricultural production (Zeuli & Skees, 
2005; Leiva & Skees, 2008). 
The aim of this article is to propose an insurance 
tool to protect irrigators against water scarcity in the 
framework of the SCIS. The tool would mitigate the 
economic cost of water shortages. The novelty of our 
approach, with respect to other insurance schemes 
proposed, is the use of an expert panel formed by 8 
individuals representing all stakeholders to select which 
design is more adapted to the needs of the Spanish ir-
rigators. The Panel included experts and stakeholders 
related to both water management in the Spain and the 
SCIS. As a result of the expert panel (the next section 
offers a detailed description), the best option to ensure 
irrigated crops in Spain would be a Hydrological 
Drought Index Insurance (HDII) contracted by the Ir-
rigation District (ID). Index insurance to protect irriga-
tors against water scarcity had already been proposed 
in the literature by Zeuli & Skees (2005) and Leiva & 
Skees (2008). However, we propose a simpler design, 
detail the conditions that the ID should fulfill in order 
to be insured under this policy, and analyze the hedging 
effectiveness of the instrument comparing the gross 
margin of the ID with and without the insurance con-
tract. Similarly to Brown & Carriquiry (2007), we 
propose a unitary indemnity, but based on crop produc-
tion and adapted to the ID. HDII is applied to the 
Bardenas Irrigation District V (ID-V). Besides, to re-
spond to the interest shown by some expert panel 
participants, we discuss the possibility to subsidize the 
proposed insurance scheme within the EU legislative 
framework.
Material and methods
Selection of the insurance type: Expert panel
An expert panel1 was called on to define the insur-
ance scheme the more appropriate to cover water sup-
ply risk in the Spanish irrigated agriculture, the difficul-
ties that the implementation of this instrument would 
involve, and its potential acceptance among irrigators, 
insurance suppliers and the administration. The Panel 
met on May 2014 in the Technical University of Madrid 
with four participants from IDs, one from crop insur-
ance companies, one from the Ministry of Agriculture, 
one from the Spanish State Agency for Agricultural 
Insurance and one from River Basin Water Boards. 
Figure 1 represents the options proposed to the expert 
tralia, Chile and the United States under widely differ-
ent regulatory frameworks, facilitating the reallocation 
of water resources among users, therefore allocating 
water to high-value uses and improving water use ef-
ficiency. At the European Union (EU) level, only Spain 
has developed a regulatory framework to permit water 
trading (Easter and Huang, 2014; Rey et al., 2014). 
Insurance is also a means to manage water supply in-
stability (Pérez & Gómez, 2013; Rey et al., 2015).
The Spanish Crop Insurance System (SCIS) is one 
of the most advanced and widespread systems in the 
EU, serving as a benchmark for international com-
parisons of insurance systems (OECD, 2011).Yet, ir-
rigated agriculture is unprotected against losses due to 
the lack of water for irrigation. In Spain, irrigated land 
covers 13% of the useful agricultural surface, contrib-
uting to 50% of the total agricultural production value 
(INE, 2012). In spite of the recurrent drought episodes 
that affect Spain (Estrela & Vargas, 2012), irrigated 
surface is still increasing. In the period 2004-2014, 
irrigated surface increased on average 1% per year 
(MARM, 2014a). In consequence, there is an evident 
need for an insurance policy to cover the risk of water 
scarcity, as has already been demanded by the agricul-
tural sector. 
As far as we know, the only experience on drought 
insurance for irrigated agriculture is implemented in 
the USA. The Multiple Peril Crop Insurance program 
in the USA covers the unexpected failure of irrigation 
water supply. Irrigated yield losses are covered when 
water shortages are due to a naturally occurring event 
and cannot be foreseen at the time of the insurance 
take-up (prevented planting insurance is a possible 
alternative when a water shortage is expected). The 
insurance scheme has detailed provisions in order to 
avoid moral hazard. Besides, decreased water alloca-
tions due to a diversion of water for environmental 
reasons, selling water to municipalities, or other 
causes are not covered (Risk Management Agency - 
Topeka, 2015).
Several researchers have proposed other insurance 
schemes covering water shortage risk. Traditional 
schemes, using crop production functions or crop 
simulation models to assess the economic impact of 
drought have been proposed in some irrigated regions 
of Spain (Quiroga et al., 2011; Pérez & Gómez, 2013; 
Ruiz et al., 2013, 2015). Index insurance mechanisms 
have been proposed in the literature seeking to cover 
financial risks for water managers (Brown & Carri-
quiry, 2007; Zeff & Charaklis, 2013) and offering 
1 The expert panel is part of the project “Hydrological drought insurance for irrigation: an adaptation tool for climate change” 
(AGL2010-17634).
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compatible with voluntary exchanges of water rights. 
In the case of an irrigator selling water rights, the index 
insurance scheme will only compensate for the poten-
tial loss associated to the DI value, while the actual 
additional decrease in the crop production value due 
to the transfer of water rights will be compensated 
exclusively by the water rights price. In consequence 
both compensations are complementary, and do not 
overlap as in the previous case. At the same time, the 
use of more efficient irrigation methods, water banking 
and the use of other water sources is not discouraged. 
The farmer would still want to obtain the highest pos-
sible yield, since the insurance will anyway pay the 
indemnity that corresponds to the potential loss of each 
farm. Irrigators will not hesitate in buying water to 
other irrigators, investing on more efficient irrigation 
techniques, in order to obtain a higher yield. Index 
insurance is also easier to implement because there is 
no need to monitor moral hazard and to perform on 
field loss-assessment.
Several difficulties hindering the implementation of 
such scheme were identified. Basis risk is one of them, 
which implies that the payment may not necessarily cor-
respond to the actual losses incurred by the insurance 
policy holder (Skees et al., 2008). This is due to the fact 
that there is some flexibility when applying water al-
location rules. As a consequence, the relationship be-
tween indicator and water allotments may change from 
year to year. This flexibility in applying water distribu-
tion rules is transformed in basis risk of the index insur-
ance. Basis risk leads to discontent among policyholders, 
and providers too. An example of the importance of basis 
panel in respect to the insurance design and the policy 
holder. Conclusions derived from the expert panel 
development are exposed in next paragraphs and sum-
marized in Figure 1. 
Two types of insurance schemes were discussed (1) 
a traditional insurance scheme, with on–field loss ad-
justment, and (2) an index insurance. In this paper, we 
refer to index insurance as a type of weather or hydro-
logical based index insurance, in which the indemnity 
is based on measurements of a specific weather or 
hydrologic parameter which is the Drought Index (DI). 
In the proposed index insurance the indemnities are 
calculated from an hydrological DI which is multiplied 
by a unitary value of water (calculated from the added 
value of water of the region). Index insurance gathered 
more acceptances among the participants to the expert 
panel. Although on-field loss-assessment provides a 
better adjustment of the losses suffered by farmers, it 
is not compatible with water markets and transfer of 
water rights. An insured irrigator that sells water rights 
will suffer a yield loss and would receive a double 
compensation or payment for the loss, from the insur-
ance scheme and from water rights transfer. In conse-
quence, the sale of water rights is not permitted in this 
type of schemes. Besides, the use of more efficient 
irrigation methods, water banking and other water 
sources (via water markets, groundwater, desalinated 
water, etc.) is not encouraged, since the payoff is ad-
justed based on the yield finally obtained, so there is 
no interest in obtaining a higher yield. On the other 
hand, an index insurance, in which the indemnity is 
based on an external objective indicator, would be 
Figure 1. Expert panel development and results. Source: own elaboration.
Type of insurance scheme
•	 Traditional	insurance	scheme	
with	on	field-loss	adjustment
•	 Index	insurance	scheme,	in	
which	indemnity	is	based	on	an	
objective	indicator
Index insurance scheme
Difficulties	of	implementation
•Basis	risk
•	 Individual	(farmer) 
•	 Collective	(Irrigation	District	or	ID)
Collective
Difficulties	of	implementation
•	 Potential	difficulties	in	premium	
and	payments	distribution	among	
irrigators	within	the	same	ID
•	 Compulsory	for	all	irrigators	
within	the	same	ID
Insurance	scheme	demand
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Expert	Panel
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GWA and the water allotment in year t or wat (equa-
tion 1):
 wst = max(GWA – wat, 0)  [1]
The water allotment in an ID (wat) in a year t is 
estimated from the Drought Index (DIt). The model f 
is estimated empirically, from historical data (equa-
tion 2). 
 wat = f(DIt)  [2]
The model reflects the decisions related to water 
management and infrastructure operations. The design 
of index insurance requires that hydrological data 
should be stationary (DI and water allotments), other-
wise detrending procedures should be implemented. In 
addition, operating rules should remain constant over 
the guarantee period of the contract. The selection of 
the index DI in which the insurance should be based 
has been widely discussed in the literature (Bielza et 
al., 2008; Leiva & Skees, 2008). The two basic prereq-
uisites of an appropriate DI are: (1) high correlation 
with the potential loss, and (2) fulfillment of the qual-
ity standards of the insurance industry (transparent, 
verifiable, observable, reported in a timely manner, and 
not subject of manipulation). Underlying DI must be 
carefully selected or designed for each ID given the 
high diversification of irrigated crops, water sources, 
water management, and water irrigation practices (Ve-
denov & Barnett, 2004).
The indemnity (€/ha) received in a year t results 
from multiplying wst by a unitary indemnity that is 
equal to the water value (wv) in €/m3. A franchise de-
ductible or γ is the minimum amount of loss that must 
be incurred before insurance coverage applies (IRMI, 
2014). A γ would help to decrease the premium rate 
and decrease operating costs of the insurance policy, 
since low severity losses would not be covered. Indem-
nity calculation in the presence of a γ would then fol-
lows equation 3:
 Indt =
0 if  wat ≥ 1− γ( )×GWA
wst  ×wvt if  wat < 1− γ( )×GWA
⎧
⎨⎪
⎩⎪
  [3]
We estimate this unitary indemnity or wv as a water 
value equivalent to the average decrease of expected 
gross margin exclusively due to the water shortage in 
the ID. The productivity of water equals the revenue 
under irrigation minus the revenue under rainfed con-
ditions (Lorite et al., 2012). Irrigation variable costs 
not incurred under water restriction situations should 
not be compensated; consequently the variable costs 
of irrigation are subtracted from water value. The fixed 
costs of irrigation (water basin authority fees, irrigation 
scheme infrastructure amortization/maintenance, and 
risk in index insurance is the case of the Normalized 
Difference Vegetation Index or NDVI insurance for 
pasture in Spain, which has been in place since 2008 
(Agroseguro, 2014). Due to the differences between 
payments and actual losses, the design is still being 
adapted in order to reduce the basis risk.
Concerning who should be the policyholder, either 
(a) individual farmer or (b) collectivity, a collective 
insurance policy, contracted by the ID as a whole, is 
preferred. This preference is explained by the fact that 
usually, within the same ID, irrigators do not receive 
the same water allotment per hectare. Water allotments 
for each irrigator are not only dependent on water avail-
ability, but they might be dependent as well on (i) the 
type of crops cultivated, (ii) water rights hold and /or 
purchased (in case there is a running water market) by 
the irrigator, and also on (iii) the quantity of water that 
each irrigator asks for at the beginning of the irrigation 
season. These water distribution mechanisms promote 
a more efficient use of water, since the most productive 
lands would probably receive more water than the least 
productive lands. But at the same time, all these vari-
ables (from (i) to (iii)) taking part in water distribution 
mechanisms within an ID make difficult defining clear 
rules in water distribution that would remain constant 
over the years. In consequence, a collective insurance 
policy is the insurance scheme most appropriate to 
cover water supply risk. Nevertheless, it was high-
lighted that the implementation of a collective policy, 
especially with regard to the premium share and the 
indemnities distribution, is a delicate issue, since indi-
vidual risk aversion and cropping patterns might be 
highly diversified within the same ID. Additionally, the 
fact that the insurance is bought by the ID, makes it 
compulsory for all irrigators, even for those who are 
not interested in buying it.
According to the ideas drawn from the expert panel 
we conclude that the best option to ensure irrigated 
crops in Spain is a HDII contracted by the ID. HDII 
uses a DI to estimate farmer losses due to water short-
ages. The unitary indemnity is given per square meter 
of water deficit per hectare. 
Index insurance design, hedging effectiveness, 
and contract conditions
The HDII defines a guaranteed level of water allot-
ment measured in m3/ha. This guaranteed water allot-
ment (GWA) is the expected water allotment and is 
calculated as the average water allotment delivered to 
irrigators in the period analyzed. Water shortage in the 
ID (wst) is measured in m3/ha, and corresponds to the 
difference between the guaranteed water allotment or 
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represent the water value (or unitary indemnity) to be 
applied dependent on the water allotment finally re-
ceived (see Figure 2 and equation 8).
 wvt = wvt(wat)  [8]
The liability or guaranteed value of the insurance 
scheme is determined following equation 9:
 Liability = GWA × wvt  [9]
The threshold of the DI that triggers a payoff (Trig-
ger) meets equation 10:
 (1 – γ) × GWA = f(DI = Trigger)  [10]
The premium rate of the insurance scheme is calcu-
lated based on the expected indemnity (equation 11), 
where t is the year and T is the number of years: 
 Premium = Indt( ) = 1T  ×
t=1
t=T
∑Indt   [11]
All premium rates calculated in this paper are pure 
premiums, without subsidies or any additional costs. 
A charge to cover administrative, underwriting, re-
serves, reinsurance and operating costs should be added 
to the premium. However, the charge should be small-
er than in traditional insurance because there is no need 
of on-field loss adjustment.
In case ligneous crops are present in the ID, several 
characteristics are to be considered when establishing 
the premium rate and the unitary indemnity: (i) crop 
distribution in the farm that presents exclusively ligne-
ous crop does not change, consequently, the unitary 
indemnity to be received by the farmer is specific to 
the crop; (ii) unitary indemnity should reflect that 
irrigation scheme personnel/administrative costs) 
should be compensated by the insurance indemnity, 
because they are borne by the farmers even if water 
deliveries are suspended during drought episodes. In 
consequence, they are not subtracted in the water value 
calculation. In any ID, crop pattern varies from year to 
year (unless the whole ID cultivates permanent crops) 
depending on the prevailing hydrological conditions. 
Therefore, we adapted the methodology applied by 
Lorite et al. (2012) to take this into account. Based on 
historical data, we established different crop pattern 
scenarios Si associated to a water allotment finally re-
ceived in the farm (wai). Several crop pattern scenari-
os were defined, ranging from a full rainfed scenario 
(S0) with no allocated irrigation water to a scenario with 
full guaranteed water allocation (SI), and including 
several intermediate scenarios (Si), where i takes values 
between 0 and I. Each scenario has an associated value 
of agricultural production (VAPi) net of variable costs 
of irrigation (VCIi), that is equal to the Net Value of 
Agricultural Production (NVAPi), all three in €/ha 
(equations 4, 5 and 6):
 VAPi =
c=1
c=C
∑ Sic × Yc × Pc⎡⎣ ⎤⎦   [4]
 VCIi =
c=1
c=C
∑ Sic ×VCIic⎡⎣ ⎤⎦   [5]
 NVAPi = VAPi – VCIi  [6]
where Sic is the share of crop c area on the ID for the I 
scenario in the ID with C crops, Yc and Pc are the 5-year 
Olympic average2 of the irrigated yield and crop price 
in kg/ha and €/kg respectively; and VCIic are the vari-
able costs of irrigation converted in €/ha associated to 
the scenario i for the crop c. 
We estimate a water value that varies depending on 
the water allocated to the ID. The average water value 
corresponding to water allotment received is calcu-
lated comparing a scenario Si   with the scenario with 
full guaranteed water allocation SI (equation 7):
 wvi = wvi wai( ) = NVAPI − NVAPiGWA− wai
  [7]
Consequently, there is an average water value for 
each water allotment wai characterizing each scenario. 
Scenarios are always compared to the GWA scenario 
SI. With the discrete water values that arise from each 
scenario i, we can establish a relationship that will 
2 The Olympic average is defined as an arithmetic mean calculated after first dropping the highest and lowest values within the last 
five years, measure that is established in the World Trade Organization’s risk management agreements.
Figure 2. Water value (wv) depending on the water allocation 
received on the ID.
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evaluation of the hedging performance of the index 
insurance, we considered a constant gross margin per 
crop, because the instrument is meant to stabilize the 
losses due to water scarcity, and not to changes in 
prices, production costs, or crop yields due to other 
causes (e.g. pests, temperatures, hail) than just water 
stress. In consequence, using the gross margin per year 
could distort the instrument performance. 
In order to generalize the methodology, we detailed 
the conditions (C) that an ID should meet to be insured 
under the insurance scheme proposed:
– (C1) The ID (actual policy holder) assembles all 
irrigators that irrigate their farm from the same water 
source. The ID is responsible of the water distribution 
among irrigators and is in charge of collecting water 
fees.
– (C2) Ideally, water supply in the ID comes from 
a reservoir or a reservoir system situated in the head-
waters, where inflows do not depend on human ac-
tions, but only on weather conditions. Otherwise, the 
DI should be selected carefully in order to be objec-
tive.
– (C3) Water shortages cannot be predicted at the 
beginning of the crop season (the take up period). In 
other words, the correlation between historical volumes 
stored at the beginning of the crop season and the his-
torical volume stored at the beginning of the irrigation 
season should be not significant.
– (C4) When implementing the insurance scheme, 
the payment of the premium and management of eco-
nomic compensations in case of drought is carried out 
by the ID’s managers. The ID distributes water, the 
premium share and the economic compensation be-
tween the farmers in order to optimize water productiv-
ity in the whole ID. The sharing rule shall be signed 
by every member of the ID.
Description of the case study
The region of study was selected in order to fulfill 
all conditions described in the previous section and is 
vulnerable to hydrological droughts. The most restric-
tive condition is C3, since it is common that reservoirs 
servicing the main irrigated areas store more than one-
year of water demands to face drought episodes. Col-
laboration and data provided by the ID was also deci-
sive to select the study area. 
Case study selected is located in the Bardenas 
General Irrigation District, in the Ebro River Basin. 
It distributes irrigation water to 82,000 ha of irrigable 
land divided into 20 irrigation sub-districts (ID) lo-
cated mainly in the province of Saragossa. Crop water 
demand is established at 7512 m3/ha (CHE, 2013). 
ligneous-crop economic losses might be higher (invest-
ment is higher) and might be prolonged several years 
after the cause of loss, since the plant health might be 
threatened and next season’s yield may be lower; (iii) 
Drought Management Plans in Spain prioritizes water 
allocation to ligneous crops over annual crops, in con-
sequence risk of water shortage is smaller.
Basis risk of the index insurance is analyzed compar-
ing insurance indemnities and actual losses. Insurance 
indemnities are calculated according to the index insur-
ance scheme, so that water allotments are estimated 
from past records of drought indices. Actual losses are 
calculated directly from historical water allotments. The 
probable farmer losses and gains due to index insurance 
basis risk are denoted as basis loss and basis gain re-
spectively (Zeng, 2000).
The hedging effectiveness of index insurance is 
analyzed by comparing ID gross margin with and with-
out the insurance contract, measuring the standard 
deviation (Kellner & Musshoff, 2011). Additionally, 
we compare the mean root square loss (MRSL), and 
minimum gross margin with and without the insurance 
contract. In addition to the pure premium, we consider 
different premium loadings representing potential ad-
ministrative and capital costs of the insurance com-
pany. MRSL is a simple function of the semivariance 
(i.e. losses) with respect to the gross margin trend 
without insurance (Vedenov & Barnett, 2004).
The gross margin in the ID in a year t (GMIDt) is 
estimated considering the gross margin by crop c (GMc) 
and the surface that each crop represents in the ID that 
year (Stc). To estimate the gross margin in the ID with 
insurance, we should add the indemnity in the year t 
(Indt) and subtract the premium rate (Premium) (equa-
tion 12).
 GMIDt =
c=1
C
∑Stc × GMc⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ + Indt − Premium( )  [12]
The average gross margin by crop is calculated fol-
lowing equation 13. 
 GMc = Yc × Pc( )− dcc + ec + lc( )×Yc⎡⎣ ⎤⎦   [13]
where c is the crop, Yc and Pc are the 5-year Olympic 
average of the irrigated yield and crop price in kg/ha 
and €/kg respectively; and dcc, ec, and lc are the 5-year 
Olympic average of the direct costs, equipment costs 
and labor force costs for producing 1 kg of crop c (in 
€/kg). Direct costs include the costs of plants and seeds, 
fertilizers, and pesticides.
For calculating the gross margin, indirect costs, 
amortizations, and subsidies were not considered. Gross 
margin of fallow land was then equal to 0. For the 
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For the empirical estimation of the regression that 
estimates water allotments depending on the Indicator, 
Drought Status Indicators (DSI) were facilitated by the 
Confederación Hidrográfica del Ebro. Last, crop water 
allotments, were sourced from the Bardenas annual 
reports (Bardenas V, 2015).
In order to estimate the unitary indemnity, depending 
on the water allotment finally received, we have defined 
different crop distribution scenarios (see Figure 3): 
– Fully irrigated scenario in Bardenas: crop surfaces 
and yields have been sourced from historical data under 
the ‘normal’ drought status following DSI definition 
which is DSI>0.5 (10 out of 13 years), which corresponds 
to the fully irrigated scenario.
– Partial drought scenario in Bardenas: crop sur-
faces and yields have been sourced from historical data 
under drought status: ‘pre-alert’, ‘alert’ or ‘emergency’, 
according to DSI (DSI<0.5). Water allotment associated 
to this scenario is the average of the water allotment re-
ceived in the historical period under these circumstances 
(3 out of 13 years).
– Extreme drought scenario in Bardenas: only rain-
fed crops. We have associated to the rainfed scenario 
(wa=0) three hypotheses of crop distributions based 
on the discussion with irrigators. In these scenarios, 
surfaces dedicated to cereals, sunflower and fallow 
increase, and the surface dedicated to rice and maize 
(high water demanding crops) disappear. Alfalfa crop, 
being a multiannual crop, remains constant.
Results
Index insurance design and premium rating
We tested several DIs, and selected the one that 
best correlates with water allotments in the ID. The 
DIs tested are those defined in the 2007 Drought 
Management Plan (DMP), called DSIs measured in 
February, March, April, May and June, for regulated 
sections (DSI based on reservoir stocks) and non-
regulated sections (DSI calculated from river flows) 
in the Aragon River Operating system (CHE, 2007). 
The DI that best correlates is the one measured in 
February for the regulated section (correlation coef-
ficient=0.74; p= 0.009), based on water stocks in Yesa 
reservoir. Although DI represents accurately the water 
availability for irrigation, it might not be a valid 
Each of the ID is responsible of the water distribution 
among the farmers. Our methodology is applied to 
the sub-district V (ID-V), located in Ejea de los Ca-
balleros.
ID-V is serviced by the Bardenas Canal, which is 
serviced with water from the Yesa Reservoir (with a 
maximum capacity of 447 hm33) on the headwaters of 
Aragón River. Yesa reservoir’s purpose is mainly ser-
vicing the ID (irrigation represents 99% of the con-
sumptive demands). Correlation between the Yesa 
Reservoir stocks in October and Yesa Reservoir stocks 
in May is equal to 0.21 and not significant (p>0.1). In 
consequence, water scarcity cannot be predicted at the 
beginning of the crop season.
The Bardenas General Irrigation District is irrigated 
mainly by surface irrigation (78%) and to a lesser ex-
tent by sprinkler irrigation (22%). The main irrigated 
crops are winter cereals (38%), maize (21%) and al-
falfa (20%) (Bardenas, 2012). Bardenas ID has been 
studied before by Causapé (2009), Uku (2011), and 
Ruiz et al. (2013). There is a Drought Management 
Plan (DMP) in the Ebro River Basin (CHE, 2007) that 
establishes preparedness and mitigation measures, 
depending on the water supply system drought status 
(emergency, alert or watch, pre-alert and normality) 
that is determined by the DMP’s Drought Status Indi-
cator (DSI). The DSIs are calculated either from res-
ervoir inflows, stocks, or in some cases piezometric 
levels and precipitation. DSI’s are standardized between 
0 and 1 (CHE, 2007). The standardized values of the 
DSIs define the drought status according to basin-
specific thresholds (Estrela & Vargas, 2012). In emer-
gency and in alert drought status (0 to 0.15, and 0.15 
to 0.30 respectively) the measures include restrictions 
in water allocation for agriculture, which get more 
severe as drought intensifies. Also priority in water 
uses is established, for instance, ligneous crops are 
given priority over other crops.
For the unitary indemnity calculation and for calcu-
lating the hedging effectiveness, data concerning pro-
vincial crop yields and national crop prices are sourced 
from the Statistical Yearbook data set published by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Environment 
(MARM, 2014b). Crop surfaces and variable irrigation 
costs from ID-V are sourced from the Bardenas an-
nual reports (Bardenas V, 2015). Production costs in 
Bardenas and regional crop prices are sourced from 
Technical Reports (MARM, 2012, 2013a, b)4.
3 Yesa reservoir enlargement Project is being executed since October 2014. It is expected that works will conclude by April 2018. 
Enlargement will allow to supply urban water to Saragossa, to Bardenas General Irrigation District, and to environmental purposes, 
and will reduce the risk of floods downstream Yesa reservoir (CHE, 2014).
4  Technical Reports are not publicly accessible. They have been provided by the Office of the Undersecretary General for Analysis, 
Prospective and Coordination at the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Environment. Therefore, they are subject to a privacy 
commitment. They can be made available upon permission from Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Environment.
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the water allotment is bigger than crop water demands 
established (d=1), otherwise, d=0 means that water 
allotments are smaller or equal to crop water demands 
established. For the index insurance design, we use the 
regression where the Binary variable d=0. Water allot-
ments are then estimated from DIt following equation 
16 that is also represented in Figure 4:
wat = 5791*** + DIt ×1235** + d × 4005**adj R2 = 0.88   [16]
Asterisks denote significance level *=10%, **=5%, 
and ***=1%.
The crop surface distribution, the water allotment 
and the NVAP associated with each scenario described 
in previous section are presented in Figure 3. ID water 
values calculated following equation 7 are a set of 
values between 0.11 and 0.12 €/m3. Given the small 
difference between the two values, for simplicity we 
applied the average water value as the unitary indem-
nity regardless of the water allotment received: 
0.115 €/m3.
The index insurance guarantees the average water 
allotment received in the ID in the period 2000-2014, 
for d=0 equal to 6537 m3/ha. To avoid problems of 
adverse selection, insurance should be sold at the be-
ginning of the crop season (October), before the rainfall 
and snow period begins. We have established two types 
of contracts: a scheme without franchise deductible 
(NFD) and with a franchise deductible (FD) equal to 
8.6%. The γ is established in 8.6% so the Trigger cor-
responds to the threshold of the DI indicating a status 
of Emergency (DSI=0.15). Premium rates, liability and 
the Trigger are presented in Table 1. Premiums are 
index due to the fact that it can be manipulated and 
thus be subject to moral hazard (Zeuli & Skees, 2005; 
Brown & Carriquiry, 2007). In order to avoid moral 
hazard, the DI is predicted using an auxiliary Index 
(Aux I). The Aux I is the sum of the inflows between 
October and January (see equation 14). Using 2000-
2013 data, the model that predicts DI is represented 
in equation 15.
 Aux I =
oct
feb
∑inflows   [14]
DI t = f Aux I( )= MIN 0.9, 0.0037 × Aux I *** − 0.4788***( )Adj R2 = 0.34   [15]
Asterisks denote significance level *=10%, **=5%, 
and ***=1%.
Linear and log linear models linking the DI selected 
and water allotments are compared by means of the 
Box-Cox transformation. Data series from 2000 to 2014 
and OLS estimation were used for the model estima-
tion. Despite the fact that water management regula-
tions have changed (Drought Management Plan is being 
applied since 2007), water management rules are con-
sistent over the whole period 2000-2014, since no 
statistically significant changes are detected before and 
after 2007.
Water allotments delivered in 2000 and 2001 are 
considered outliers, since they are far larger than the 
crop water demand that is planned in the River Basin 
Plan (CHE, 2013), which equals to 7512 m3/ha. In 
consequence, we have included in the regression a 
Binary variable d that controls for all years in which 
Figure 3. Crop surface distribution, water allotment and net value of agricultural production (NVAP) 
associated to scenarios for the calculation of the water value (or unitary indemnity) in Bardenas. wa: 
water allotment correspondant to the scenario. VAP-VCI: value of agricultural production (VAP) net 
of variable irrigation costs. GM: gross margin, which is the VAP net of variable production costs.
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is 24 €/ha and rice GM is 834 €/ha. Then GM in the ID 
by year is estimated considering average GM by crop 
and past records of crop surfaces in Bardenas ID-V for 
the period 2000-2014. 
In addition to the pure premium rate, we consider 
premium loadings of 20%, 30%, and 40%, representing 
possible administrative and capital costs of the insur-
ance company. Results of the hedging effectiveness 
analysis of the index insurance scheme can be observed 
in Table 2. Compared to the no insurance scenario, both 
insurance designs have a lower standard deviation of 
GMs, a lower Mean Root Square Loss (MRSL), and a 
larger minimum GM, for the pure premium and for all 
different premium loadings. In comparing both insur-
ance designs, the γ=0% design seems the most effective 
in reducing risk exposure under all criteria, except for 
the MRSL criteria.
Discussion
The proposed insurance scheme has some issues 
related to its implementation that merit a few com-
ments. Firstly, the implementation of the collective 
policy may confront some difficulties since all irriga-
tors in the ID should agree on the decision to insure 
and on contract conditions. In case farmers from the 
ID do not find a consensus that satisfies all of them, 
one alternative would be to establish individual con-
tracts (so contract conditions C1 & C4 would no 
calculated from both DI, and  based on data series from 
1961 to 2014.
In this research we have identified several sources 
of basis risk: basis risk associated to the selected DI, 
and basis risk associated to the use of an Aux I to es-
timate water stocks in order to reduce the risk of index 
manipulation. Both measures of basis risk are disag-
gregated in basis loss and basis gain comparing indem-
nities from the insurance scheme (based on drought 
indices either actual or estimated) to potential indemni-
ties calculated from past records of whole-farm wat for 
the historical period 2000-2014 (Table 1). Basis loss is 
always greater than basis gain, meaning that the insur-
ance scheme is overestimating water allotments in the 
period 2000-2014.
Hedging effectiveness
In order to test the performance of the index insur-
ance in reducing economic consequences of water 
supply risk, we compared the ID gross margin or GM 
with and without insurance in the period 2000-2014. 
Data available for GM calculation by crop in ID-V is 
at Autonomous Community5 scale (MARM, 2012 
2013a, b). Average GMs by crop are calculated for the 
Aragon region considering data period 2007-2011. 
Alfalfa and forage GMs are equal to 916 €/ha, maize 
GM is equal to 976 €/ha, cereals GM (soft and durum 
wheat and barley) is equal to 392 €/ha, sunflower GM 
5 Spain is divided in 17 regions, also called ‘Autonomous Communities’.
Figure 4. Model to estimate water allotments based on drought index considering 2000-2014 period. 
Binary variable d controls for all years in which the water allotment is bigger than crop water demands 
established (d=1), otherwise, d=0 means that water allotments are smaller or equal to crop water 
demands established.
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in the farm. Therefore, this could lead to some disagree-
ments with crop insurance laws, given that it could 
provide a coverage beyond the actual farm loss.
Secondly, the insurance scheme requires that water 
management rules should be implemented in full over 
the validity period of the insurance policy and no sig-
nificant changes in water infrastructure should be ob-
served. In case it does not hold, the model and all the 
calculations will need to be updated. Since there would 
not be historic data on DI and water allotments for the 
new situation, we could only rely on water simulation 
models to generate water allotments and DI values 
under the new situation. In case of technical change in 
crop production, it would not affect the index insurance 
model that estimates water allotments from a DI. How-
ever, it might affect the water allotment guaranteed and 
also the unitary indemnity estimation, since technical 
changes would result in larger farmer’s income, yield-
ing higher GM for the same water allotment. 
Thirdly, the probability and severity of droughts can 
also be influenced by climate change. Climate change 
longer be applicable). Individual contracts following 
the scheme proposed can only be established in the case 
water allocation between the farmers is fixed and not 
subject to the irrigators water allocation’s requests. 
However, this is unlikely, since usually irrigators make 
a formal request to the ID concerning the water alloca-
tion they need. Then, ID tries to meet all irrigators’ 
requests taking into account water availability and 
water rights. As a consequence, insurance is to be based 
on the average water allotment granted to the ID by the 
Basin Agency. The insurance design would then offer 
excessive coverage to irrigators cultivating low water 
demanding crops and would fall short offering coverage 
those cultivating high-water demanding crops. An-
other alternative would be to let the irrigators set 
freely the liability, as proposed by Zeuli & Skees 
(2005). The unitary indemnity received would change 
as a consequence and so would change the premium 
rate. The scheme would then work as a weather de-
rivative, since the unitary indemnity is no longer esti-
mated from past records of water allotments and GMs 
Table 1. Average indemnities, guaranteed water allotment (GWA), liability, premium rates and 
basis risk for hydrological drought index insurance (HDDI) in Bardenas, for an insurance scheme 
without franchise deductible (NFD) and an insurance scheme with a franchise deductible (FD). 
Calculations are made based on actual drought index (DI) and estimated DI ( DI )
 
 
 
 
NFD FD (γ=8.6%)
DI DI DI DI
Average indemnity 0.115 €/m3
GWA and liability 6 537 m3/ha and 752 €/ha
DI trigger (–) 0.6 0.15
Premium rate % (liability) 01.77 01.33 0.40 0.610
€/ha 13.33 10.01 3.03 4.596
Basis risk Basis loss % 02.19 02.30 1.85 1.880
Basis gain % 00.70 00.78 0 0.800
Table 2. Hedging effectiveness of the insurance schemes considering 2000-2014 period, for an 
insurance scheme without franchise deductible (NFD) and an insurance scheme with a franchise 
deductible or γ (FD)
 Premium loading
Gross margin 
standard 
deviation (€/ha)
Minimum gross 
margin (€/ha)
Mean root 
square loss  
(€/ha)
Without insurance – 55.14 612.31 127.59
With insurance NFD 
(γ=0%)
0% 44.92 631.34 71.44
20% 44.92 628.68 77.24
30% 44.92 627.34 80.24
40% 44.92 626.01 83.29
With insurance FD 
(γ=8.6%)
0% 50.59 628.6 69.14
20% 50.59 628.0 70.56
30% 50.59 627.7 71.27
40% 50.59 627.4 71.99
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There are some issues about the use of the Aux I, 
which is required in case the selected DI might be 
subject to manipulation. One disadvantage of its use is 
the increase in basis risk. In our case study, the use of 
an Aux I increases basis loss (0.11% for NFD and 
0.03% for FD) and basis gain (0.08% for NFD and 
0.8% for FD). Another important fact to take into ac-
count is that the Aux I would not reflect some impedi-
ments that might prevent water from being delivered 
to irrigators, such as a breakdown in the canals or 
conveyance system, or a pollution problem. Under 
these circumstances, irrigators would not receive an 
indemnity, but would suffer economic losses. This 
would need to be clearly stated in the policy wording. 
If water management is performed according to prede-
fined rules, there would be no need of such an Aux I, 
which may be warranted when the selected DI (e.g. 
water stocks in the reservoir) might be subject of ma-
nipulation. This would need further discussion with all 
stakeholders involved.
It is interesting to observe how basis risk is distrib-
uted among basis loss and basis gain. Ideally basis loss 
and basis gain should be similar, so the insurance 
scheme is favoring neither the farmer nor the insurance 
company. In Bardenas, basis loss in the analysis period 
is larger than basis gain in all cases, meaning that the 
insurance scheme is overestimating water allotments. 
This is due to the fact that in several years the DI was 
above the trigger, and irrigators received a water allot-
ment below the guaranteed water allotment. These 
cases would require further investigation. Despite this, 
the hedging effectiveness analysis shows that NFD and 
FD insurance schemes are effectively reducing risk 
exposure, even considering a 40% premium load to 
cover administrative and capital costs of the insurance 
company. Note that premium loading for the FD 
scheme might be smaller than for the NFD scheme, 
because the more frequent the payoffs take place, the 
higher the administrative costs that the insurance com-
pany is going to charge.
Results suggest that the insurance scheme would be 
useful to provide economic stability to IDs. It would 
constitute a means for irrigators to adapt to climate 
variability and it could encourage investment in irriga-
tion technologies as a means of adaptation for dryland 
farmers. It would also promote a more efficient use of 
the irrigation water. This insurance can be generalized 
to any ID fulfilling the conditions mentioned in Section 
“Index insurance design, hedging effectiveness, and 
contract conditions”. IDs not fulfilling condition C3 
might be subject to intertemporal adverse selection. 
Intertemporal adverse selection comes from the fact 
that preseason weather information can influence crop 
insurance decisions (Carriquiry & Osgood 2012), as 
introduces an additional factor of uncertainty in drought 
risks (Bielza et al., 2008). Increasing drought risk re-
sulting from climate change affects the price of insur-
ance in two ways. First, ambiguity and catastrophe 
loads may increase because uncertainty associated with 
future climate change impacts leads insurers to plan 
for the worst likely scenario when establishing these 
loads. Historical return periods may not be valid since 
they might underestimate the likelihood of agricul-
tural losses in the future. Second, increasing drought 
risk changes the pure risk (Collier et al., 2009). In 
consequence, insurance parameters have to be adjusted 
over time to effectively hedge future weather risk (Kap-
phan et al., 2012).
Finally, unitary indemnity estimation does not com-
pletely offset economic losses that might affect ligne-
ous crops in case of drought, especially when drought 
affects production in subsequent years.
Some limitations specifically related to our findings 
for the Bardenas case study are associated to data avail-
ability. The unitary indemnity estimation and hedging 
effectiveness analysis rely on provincial and regional 
data, and not on local data. Besides, some of the crop 
patterns linked to water allotment scenarios, used for 
the unitary indemnity calculation, are designed based 
on the discussion with irrigators, due to the lack of 
longer data series. This could be a source of inaccura-
cies in the results that could be addressed with ap-
propriate and longer data series. Collaboration among 
insurance companies, producers associations, and/or 
public entities would be required to have access to a 
more appropriate data.  Besides, we have detected the 
presence of outliers in water allotments in the period 
analyzed, which had to be addressed including a Bi-
nary variable to the model.
Additional insight into the quality of our results is 
gathered by comparing our findings to previous lit-
erature results. Firstly, the liability of our insurance 
scheme (equal to 752 €/ha) is smaller than the liabil-
ity reported by Ruiz et al. (2013) in a drought whole-
farm insurance with on-field loss adjustment covering 
irrigated crops, also in Bardenas (equal to 1488 €/ha). 
This difference is due to the fact that our index insur-
ance scheme takes into account that farmers not being 
able to irrigate may still have the alternative of pro-
ducing rainfed crops (when cultivating annual crops), 
and thus earning some revenue (except for the case 
of rice, which is cultivated on marginal soils). Sec-
ondly, our unitary indemnity estimation can be com-
pared to Lorite et al. (2012) works in a southern river 
basin in Spain. We obtained a unitary indemnity of 
0.115 €/m3 that is in the range of Lorite et al. (2012) 
results: wheat (0.054 €/m3), sunflower (0.092 €/m3), 
and maize (0.15 €/m3).
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30% loss in terms of water allotment). Although the 
insurance scheme in our case study will not be consid-
ered to be compatible with EU legislation7, FD scheme 
in other regions would be, provided irrigators would 
be exposed to water shortages destroying more than 
30% of the average annual production and the DI would 
be accepted as a weather variable.
The main strength of this insurance scheme is the 
compatibility with water markets, water banking, trans-
fer of water rights, and groundwater use. Another im-
portant strength is that farmers might receive the 
economic compensation as soon as the DI is measured, 
far before the end of the crop season, allowing them to 
have ready cash for any eventuality arising in the crop 
season, such as the possibility of participating in water 
market mechanisms. 
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